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EDITOR’S NOTE
The United Nations Organization is not different from other structures 
created by humans—at least in this sense: it is not immune to the vaga-
ries of change. Most modifications are partly induced by external pres-
sures and partly generated by organic permutations. Thus, in 2005, 
spoke Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General:
As globalization shrinks distances…issues become increasingly intercon-
nected, the comparative advantage of the United Nations becomes ever 
more evident. So, too, however, do some of its real weaknesses. From 
overhauling basic management practices and building a more trans-
parent, efficient and effective United Nations system to revamping our 
major intergovernmental institutions so that they reflect the world…we 
must reshape the organization in ways not previously imagined and 
with a boldness and speed not previously shown.1
Before I comment on Annan’s call for transformation, a very brief 
review of the making of the organization’s history seems in order. The 
appearance of the modern nation-state was a momentous happening. 
At least as far back as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state 
brought with it claims of exclusive and clashing identities and material 
interest that, in a number of registers, created new tensions which, in 
turn, necessitated transnational means and institutions of adjudication, 
if not collaboration. More dramatically, though the tug between the 
twin phenomena of warring and peace-making have an older pedi-
gree, it was the birth of nationalism and its structural embodiment, the 
modern state, that at once compounded a contradictory, competitive, 
and conflictual “Othering” and the possibilities for larger mutualities 
among the different.
On top of earlier but more limited battles between some (primarily 
European) nations over territory, imperial ambition, or national pride, 
the Twentieth Century is quintessentially known for two conflagra-
tions, dubbed world wars. The designation was appropriate mainly 
because of the geographical scale, the magnitude of the destruction, 
and the consequences for international coexistence. The war of 1914–
1918 has acquired a legendary status based on its unprecedented 
degree of intimate ferocity; the Second World War, 1939–1945, is best 
remembered for being the first bloody clash in which nuclear weap-
ons were used. Among the numerous ramifications of each war were 
xi
efforts to shorten the duration of blood letting, as well as search for 
the cessation of hostilities and institutional arrangements that would 
secure peace in the future.
In an attempt to simultaneously keep the United States out of what 
was primarily a European affair and to insure that the option of peace 
would be available, President Woodrow Wilson, on 22 January 1917, 
announced to the world a perspective of “peace without victory.” 
The structural linchpin of the vision was to be the League of Nations. 
Though Wilson was neither successful in his objective to avoid Ameri-
can involvement in the war nor the immediate materialization of the 
League, the idea for the latter was given new visibility by the Pres-
ident’s January 8, 1918, announcement of his now famous Fourteen 
Points. A key item here was the proposition that every nation would 
“determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing 
by the other peoples of the world as against force and self aggression.” 
This declaration has since become a source of inspiration for, if not the 
battle cry of, every group that identifies itself as a cohesive community 
and in search of recognition by others.
Whatever the long-term promise and ultimate value of the League 
of Nations in creating a new international order, new developments 
took the wind out of its sails: the rise of an acute resentment on the 
part of the defeated Central Powers, especially Germany and Italy; 
the onset of the Great Depression that started in 1929; and the Italian 
fascist invasion of Ethiopia. The first is illuminated by the reactions of 
Germany and Italy to the armistice of November 1918 and the comple-
tion of the terms of defeat, including the reorganization of Europe, the 
Middle East, China, and Africa, a year later. In the second case, tens of 
millions in the industrial West experienced a drastic shrinkage of their 
material welfare to such an extent that they were thrown into abject 
poverty, if not destitution and immediate hunger. Third, Italy was a 
comparatively latecomer to its own national unification and, thus, felt 
left with meager possibilities to satisfy its own appetite for colonial 
conquest. It decided to win two victories in one act—that is, redeem its 
resounding defeat by Abyssinia at the battle of Adowa in 1896 (the first 
modern time a non-European state vanquished a European power) 
and establish itself among the colonial club of states.
The League of Nations, structurally so weak, did not survive these 
pressures. With Japan’s launch of full-scale aggression against China in 
1937, the galloping nazification and militarization of Germany and its 
subsequent takeover of Austria in 1938 and attacks on Czechoslovakia 
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and Poland in March and September of 1939, the League’s total inef-
fectiveness became glaringly obvious. The Second World War was in 
full swing. In quick time, it will engulf most of Europe, many parts of 
Asia and North Africa, and directly involve the United States. Though 
the Axis was crushed, the cost was colossal, particularly in human lives 
and material assets. Consequently, the old conundrum of how to at 
once minimize conditions conducive to warfare and cultivate peace-
ful relations among nations returned with even greater force. Part of 
the genesis of what we now call the United Nations Organization goes 
back to August 1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill of Britain signed what was then named 
the “Atlantic Charter.” Nearly half a year later, 26 countries bestowed 
the words “United Nations” to distinguish themselves from Germany, 
Japan, and Italy. The main aim was to sketch the policies of the alli-
ance.
Inspired by President Roosevelt’s wishes, a conference was con-
vened in the city of San Francisco in April 1945, with the intention of 
drafting the U.N. Charter. Though President Roosevelt was by then 
dead, the Truman Administration carried the effort forward. The foun-
dational principle of the new United Nations Organization was to 
forestall another world war and, thus, secure future generations from 
a fate potentially worse than that of their ancestors. Notwithstanding 
the loftiness of the objectives and the sobriety that accompanied the 
conclusion of the War, a jostling for power among the victorious and 
the newly ambitious quickly transpired. More specifically, the “Big 
Three” allies (U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and Britain) ran into significant dif-
ferences in their respective understanding of the ensuing post-war 
era and the structure, functions, and decision-making processes of the 
organization. A number of new arrangements were enacted to clarify 
important responsibilities. For instance, inequality in power among 
the members was expressed through the creation of the Security Coun-
cil, with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China, and a weak 
France given permanent seats and veto power over resolutions. All 
the founding countries, who in 1945 amounted to fifty-one, automati-
cally became members of the United Nations Organization, with seats 
in the General Assembly. The greatest expansion of the membership 
of the U.N.O. came with the decolonization of the 1950s and early 
1960s, when many of the people of what we now call the “Global 
South” became sovereign nations. At the time of this writing, there 
are 192 members. In addition to the Security Council and the General 
xiv
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Assembly, the other main components include the Economic and Social 
Council, the International Court of Justice, and the General Secretariat. 
There are also the linked but autonomous organizations and specialist 
technical institutions (e.g., UNESCO, FAO, WHO, UNEP, etc.). Despite 
the creation of such a complex structure, there is no question that the 
U.N.O. has very limited power. Though informed by idealism and a 
spirit of cosmopolitanism, its effectiveness is highly constrained by 
two onerous factors: the self-interest of its members (especially the 
powerful) and the immensity, in the face of meager resources, of the 
problems that face the world. The first is the familiar syndrome of 
seeking national particularity and concomitant leadership that thrives 
on stressing difference as well as a normalization of a zero-sum mind-
set (first tutored by Nicolo Machiavelli and refined for contemporary 
international affairs by his epigons called “realists”). Some scholars go 
even further and postulate that this contradictory dimension was devi-
ously present in the thinking of the United States at the very founding 
moment of the organization.
The Roosevelt Administration hit upon a fundamental insight: that inter-
national institutions could be constructed to face simultaneously in two 
radically different directions. One face would be turned in the direction 
of mass popular politics, both within the U.S. and internationally. This 
would be the inspiring ethical face, offering promise of a better world. 
But simultaneously, the internal face of the organization could be shaped 
in an entirely different and indeed opposite way, as a framework for the 
power politics of the hegemon. Moreover, this was the key to success 
in setting up the U.N.—the two would not be in tension: the moralistic 
mask could both conceal and strengthen the inner countenance of the 
institution.2
The second issue ranges from existing possessions or new acquisi-
tions of weapons of mass destruction; mass poverty and inequality 
(particularly within nations), in which a distancing of the economy and 
politics from public influence, if not regulation, commensurate with 
the power of the citizen, is on the rise; and environmental menaces of 
biblical proportions that seem to be gathering momentum. In recent 
years, many have put their faith in the office of the Secretary-General 
to assume the mantle of global leadership, but this wish has met with 
severe disappointments primarily attributable to the original design.
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The U.N., writes Samantha Powers, gave equal voice to dictatorships and 
democracies, but its charter took sides, calling on members to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The U.N., like any other orga-
nization, depended on authoritative leadership, but power was put in 
the hands of the Security Council, a squabbling committee dominated by 
five permanent members with widely divergent interests and political 
systems. The Secretary-General, the nominal face of the organization, 
was appointed to serve as only the chief administrative officer. He was 
a servant of the states, a point drive home by his place of work, a secre-
tariat.3
There is a lot to cogitate upon in the sobering judgments of Cowan 
and Powers. But some attribute the shortcomings of the United Nations 
to other factors. Eminent here are (neo-) conservatives in the United 
States. They accuse the organization of being guilty of a number of 
capital offenses: (a) a departure from the “original mission” which was 
limited to aiding member nations in peaceful resolution of interna-
tional misunderstandings, if not disputes; (b) an enormous growth of 
bureaucratic complexity and duplication; (c) a mismanagement of its 
finances and outright malfeasance; (d) a weakening of administrative 
competence and, in its place, practices of cronyism; and (e) an undue 
hostility to its greatest benefactor, the United States. To amplify these 
defects, American critics have long suggested a return to what they 
hold to be the primary purpose of the organization and, thus, a retreat 
from expanding transgressions on the sovereignty of nation-states. 
Conservatives would not want the U.N.O. to be involved in holding 
elections or supplying food to the starving, let alone getting ensnared 
by what they see as ill-advised and bottomless projects of “nation 
building.” Moreover, to discourage “wasteful indulgences,” they prof-
fer that the U.N. budget and administrative operations be drastically 
reduced, perhaps by as much as half in the case of employees. Extreme 
conservatives are so suspicious of the very existence of the U.N. that 
they believe that it is simply a Trojan horse for a “totalitarian World 
Government” bent on usurping American sovereignty and, therefore, 
destroying its unique institutions of political culture. In light of this 
perspective, the extreme Right would prefer the U.S. to leave the orga-
nization and have U.N. headquarters moved somewhere else. The less 
paranoid, if not more informed and worldly, demand less onerous 
financial contributions from the U.S. and a more explicit appreciation 
from the rest for America’s principles, generosity, and willingness to 
carry a larger portion of the burden.4
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On the other side, the point of view of the Left is equally critical. 
With the intense and continuing debate over the invasion of Iraq and 
other explosive issues in the Middle East in the background, Perry 
Anderson asserts that U.S. dominance, though not victorious or visible 
in every instance, still conditions major decision making.
Today, paramountcy does not mean omnipotence. The U.S. cannot count 
on always securing UN legitimation of its actions ex ante. But where this 
is wanting, retrospective validation is readily available, as the occupation 
of Iraq has shown. What is categorically excluded is active opposition on 
the part of the UN to any significant U.S. initiative. A Security Coun-
cil resolution, let alone a secretary-general, condemning an American 
action is unthinkable. Ben Ki-Moon, whose appointment required Chi-
nese assent, may keep a lower profile than Annan, but his role is unlikely 
to be very different. The U.S. grip on the organization has not relaxed, 
as can be seen from current UN resolutions on Lebanon and Iran. Anx-
ious voices form liberal opinion, worrying that the organization might 
become irrelevant if Bush’s ‘unilateralism’ were to persist, and plaintive 
appeals from the Left to defend the UN from distortion by Washing-
ton, are regularly heard today. That can be reassured. The future of the 
United Nations is safe. It will continue to be, as it was intended to be, a 
serviceable auxiliary mechanism of the Pax Americana.5
If some doubt that the founding of the United Nations Organization 
was solely a sincere attempt to at once end the hostilities and usher in 
an epoch of mutual security and peace among nations, the record of 
the past sixty years displays significant accomplishments. True, there 
had been numerous local conflicts, regional instabilities, and, of course, 
four decades of a balance of terror between two nuclear-armed camps. 
Yet, the U.N.O. rightly celebrated this milestone, legitimately claim-
ing credit for the avoidance, thus far, of a cataclysmic Third World 
War. Furthermore, the U.N. agencies have taken numerous initiatives 
to address scourges such as disease, hunger, and ignorance. These 
achievements notwithstanding, a combination of old and new doubts 
is haunting the organization. Prominent among the first are the prevail-
ing distribution of power among regions and nations (particularly in 
the Security Council), a paucity of successful and deliberative thinking 
that produces impartially binding resolutions, the resistance to elect-
ing an autonomous and empowered leadership, and acute inadequacy 
of financial contributions. The more novel concerns bring forth issues 
that relate to institutional competence, transparency, and efficiency.
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But, as former Secretary-General Kofi Annan had already declared, 
the epoch of globalization is forging out of the durable worries and the 
fast-moving developments a deeper and more complicated challenge: 
the coexistence of at once different yet continuously interpenetrating 
global histories and intensifying urgencies around specific issues. Rob-
ert W. Cox, one of the most original and cosmopolitan thinkers of our 
time, offers a precious counsel that is worthy of a lengthy reproduc-
tion:
In a multi-civilizational world order, the role of a world organization 
would be to seek out principles acceptable in the ‘common sense’ or 
intersubjectivity of each of the different civilizations—to distill a kind 
of supra-intersubjectivity from the distinct intersubjectivities of its com-
ponent parts. This could only come about through a lengthy learning 
process from experience in reconciling conflicts. Two conditions would 
be indispensable: the emergence of a core body of people who would 
cultivate an empathetic understanding of forms of common sense other 
than their own—who could bridge intersubjectivities; and the develop-
ment of civil societies capable of articulating the basic sentiments and 
goals of the people who compose them… .  Civil society is the force that 
develops the intersubjective content of civilizations; and the core group 
which assumes the task of reconciliation of differences would have to 
keep abreast of these developments in the dynamics of civilization. This 
concept of a structure for world order is far from being an institutional-
ized form of global governance. It envisages a weak centre embody-
ing certain accepted common principles in a world fragmented among 
peoples guided by different sets of social practices and goals. Such a plu-
ralistic framework of weak centre in a fragmented whole has precedence 
in world history—in the European medieval Papacy, and in periods of 
Chinese history, for example. Such a structure would not displace the 
nation-state system or the international economy. It would provide the 
framework of principles within which the state system and economic 
relations could be regulated.6
In addition to his call for a cosmopolitan “common sense,” Cox 
identifies specific issues that many agree to be at the heart of a reinvig-
orated United Nations Organization: protection of the environment, 
avoidance of violence and aggression, curbing of social inequities, 
restraining if not extinguishing organized criminal activities, and the 
establishment of a common understanding and promotion of human 
rights. The world needs the U.N.O. more now than six decades ago. 
xviii
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The organization also desperately needs the full attention of, and con-
crete investment from, its members more than ever before.
*****
Our discussion opens with the keynote remarks of Janice Gross Stein. 
Cognizant of numerous difficulties that confront the organization, 
including its very legitimacy, Stein focuses on three items she considers 
to be of great normative weight: “Freedom from want, freedom from 
fear, and freedom to live in dignity.” According to Stein, the U.N. can’t 
be solely responsible for these concerns, but to be part of the solution, 
the organization must become a more efficient convener and manager 
at the core of “newly emergent global networks.”
Francis M. Deng’s main concern is the troublesome disjunction 
between the pull of national interest and that of transnational solidar-
ity. His essay concentrates on “the crisis of internal displacement and 
the response of the United Nations.” In response, Tonderai W. Chi-
kuhwa explores the pivotal concept of “sovereignty as responsibility.” 
He suggests that, “positive dialogue and diplomacy” would have to 
be coupled with “a structured regime of compliance” if the world is 
to effectively address the needs of those in greatest danger. Dianna J. 
Shandy stresses three points: the role of colonial legacies and current 
disparities in global power relations; the ramification of diminished 
sovereignty as a result of an “ascendancy” of NGO influence in Africa; 
and the implications of the distinction made between a refugee and an 
internally displaced person.
Among the severe critics of the United Nations is Nile Gardiner. 
His remarks underscore what he sees as the countless and embarrass-
ing failures of the organization. These range from mismanagement of 
assets and corruption to ineffectiveness in the face of brutal autocracies 
bent on using aggression and terror to get their way. Gardiner makes a 
spirited case for the United States’ commitment and material contribu-
tion to the birth and sustainability of the United Nations. He stresses 
that the fate of the organization is, as it were, in its own hands. Its 
future depends on how competently it responds to the three demons 
of the present: terrorism, tyranny, and genocide. Natalia Mari Espejo 
concurs with some of Gardiner’s contributions and disputes other 
arguments, including the role of the United States. Espejo reminds us 
of the “structural shortcomings” of the U.N. as well as the impact of 
“the current geopolitical reality.” Andrew Latham begins his response 
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to Gardiner by digging up the neo-conservative ideological underpin-
nings of the perspective. Second, Latham deems Gardiner’s suggestion 
to improve the organization to be, in the end, “either irrelevant or 
counterproductive.” This is a fierce engagement that at once acknowl-
edges the necessary reforms the U.N.O. must embrace and yet defends 
the organization against any crude manipulations by the most power-
ful.
*****
The 2007 Macalester International Roundtable returns to the area of 
the arts, but with a twist. With the theme The Musical Imagination in 
the Age of Globalization, the Roundtable will comprise scholarly essays 
and discussions on the music of regions such as the Mediterranean and 
Western Europe, China, and African America, as well as an evening 
musical performance. We are looking forward to this combination.
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